Failure detectors are a service that provides (approximate) information about process crashes in a distributed system. The well-known "eventually perfect" failure detector, 3P, has been implemented in partially synchronous systems with unknown upper bounds on message delay and relative process speeds. However, previous implementations have overlooked an important subtlety with respect to measuring the passage of time in "celerating" environments, in which absolute process speeds can continually increase or decrease while maintaining bounds on relative process speeds. Existing implementations either use action clocks, which fail in accelerating environments, or use real-time clocks, which fail in decelerating environments. We propose the use of bichronal clocks, which are a composition of action clocks and real-time clocks. Our solution can be readily adopted to make existing implementations of 3P robust to process celeration, which can result from hardware upgrades, server overloads, denial-of-service attacks, and other system volatilities.
Introduction
A failure detector can be viewed as a distributed oracle that can be queried for (potentially incorrect) information about process crashes. Despite such unreliability, failure detectors can solve many classic problems that are not solvable in crash-prone asynchronous message-passing systems (for example, fault tolerant consensus [5] , and wait-free dining [21] ).
Failure detectors were introduced by Chandra and Toueg in [5] to circumvent the impossibility of faulttolerant consensus in asynchrony [12] . This seminal paper introduced a hierarchy of eight failure detector classes. Subsequent work introduced several other failure detector classes (e.g., Heartbeat [1] , Marabout [13] , Omega [3] , Accrual [15] , and Trusting [6] ).
This paper focuses on the eventually perfect failure detector -3P -defined in the original Chandra-Toueg hierarchy. Informally, 3P can give arbitrary (incorrect) information about process crashes for a finite computational prefix. Eventually, however, it provides perfect information about process crashes. Note that time after which 3P starts providing perfect information is potentially unknown. More precisely, 3P satisfies the following properties [5] :
• Strong Completeness: Every crashed process is eventually and permanently suspected by every correct process.
• Eventual Strong Accuracy: For each run, there exists a time after which no correct process is suspected by any correct process.
The failure detector 3P is sufficiently powerful to solve many classic problems in distributed computing, including fault tolerant consensus [5] , stable leader election [2] , quiescent reliable communication [1] , waitfree contention management [14] , crash-locality-1 dining philosophers [20] , and wait-free dining under eventual weak exclusion [21] .
However, 3P cannot be implemented in purely asynchronous systems. It requires the underlying system to provide some temporal guarantees on communication and computation. Such systems are said to be partially synchronous.
Partial synchrony
As mentioned above, system models providing certain temporal guarantees on communication and computation are said to be partially synchronous ( [7, 8] ).
Among the various partially synchronous models defined in [7] and [8] , the most popular ones are denoted M 1 and M 2 (denoted as such in [5] ).
Informally stated, in model M 1 , there exist unknown bounds on relative process speeds and message delay, and these bounds hold perpetually. Model M 2 , on the other hand, states that there exist known bounds on relative process speeds and message delay, but these bounds hold only eventually. In addition to M 1 and M 2 , there is a third popular model, denoted M 3 . The model M 3 , defined in [5] , is derived from M 1 and M 2 , and states that there exist unknown bounds on relative process speeds and message delay, and these bounds hold only eventually. The models M 1 , M 2 , and M 3 , are collectively referred to as M * .
Process Celeration
It is widely believed that 3P can be implemented in the M * models. While this belief happens to be true, implementations of 3P in such models have overlooked an important subtlety with respect to measuring the passage of time in celerating environments, wherein absolute process speeds can continually increase and/or decrease while maintaining bounds on relative process speeds. Such traditional implementations of 3P can precipitate an infinite number of failure detector mistakes in celerating environments.
Contribution
We show that existing implementations of 3P in M * models, although correct in static environments, fail to behave correctly in celerating environments. We define a new type of clock called bichronal clocks, and show that these clocks can be used to implement 3P in such celerating partially synchronous environments. Additionally, we discuss the advantages of bichronal clocks in improving scalability and performance of 3P during volatile periods like hardware upgrades, denial-ofservice attacks, and server overloads.
Existing implementations of 3P in M *
There are several implementations of 3P in M * and other models of partial synchrony in the existing literature [5, 19, 4, 17, 10, 2, 18] . These implementations are based on the deduction that upper bounds on relative process speeds and message delay translate to an (unknown) upper bound on end-to-end, and round trip, communication delay. The end-to-end communication delay is the duration between the send of a message and its receipt. Similarly, a round-trip communication delay is the duration between the send of a message, and the receipt of its corresponding ack. These bounds on communication delay are adaptively estimated using some form of adaptive timers. Such adaptive timers start with some initial estimate of the bound on end-toend (or round trip) communication delay and eventually converge to the de facto bound, after which correct processes are never suspected as crashed.
These adaptive timers use one of two techniques to measure time locally:
• Action Clocks: One technique to measure the passage of time is to count the number of actions executed locally at each process. Action clocks accomplish this by incrementing their clock value by one every time the process takes a step.
• Real-time Clocks: Alternatively, each process is assumed to have a real-time local clock which measures time with bounded drift. In practice, these clocks are realized by hardware devices such as crystal oscillators. Note that the real-time clocks need not measure real time perfectly. They can tick at different rates at each process. The only requirement is that there exist some bound on their drift.
3 End-to-end communication delay in M * Note that the correctness of implementations cited in Section 2 depends on the existence of bounds on end-toend communication delay. While the existence of such bounds is fairly straightforward in non-celerating environments, demonstrating the same in celerating environments (where processes can accelerate and/or decelerate continually) is more subtle.
Non-celerating M * environments.
In non-celerating M * environments, the process speeds, by definition, do not accelerate or decelerate continually. In other words, there exist some (potentially unknown) upper and lower bounds on absolute process speeds. Given such bounds on absolute process speeds, in conjunction with an upper bound on message delay, demonstrating an upper bound on end-to-end communication delay is straightforward 1 .
Action Clocks. Since we know that there exists an upper bound on absolute process speeds in noncelerating environments, there exists an upper bound on the number of actions a process can execute while a message is in transit (note that there exists an upper bound on message delay). Additionally, sending and receiving a message is assumed to be atomic and hence requires exactly one local action each. Since there exists an upper bound on relative process speeds, there exists an upper bound on the number of actions executed at each process while a message is either being sent or received. In other words, there exists an upper bound on the number of action clock ticks while a message is being sent, is in transit, and is being received. That is, there exists an upper bound on end-to-end message delay as measured by an action clock.
Real-time Clocks. A lower bound on absolute process speeds in non-celerating environments implies an upper bound on the real-time duration for a message to be generated and sent, as well as an upper bound on the real-time duration to complete the receipt of the message. Since the upper bound on message delay is assumed, there exists an upper bound on end-to-end communication delay, as measured by real-time clocks.
Celerating M * environments
Celerating environments allow processes to accelerate and/or decelerate continually. Hence, absolute process speeds for (live) processes may be unbounded in such environments. This makes demonstrating an upper bound on end-to-end communication delay problematic.
Consider end-to-end communication in three such M * environments: accelerating environments, decelerating environments, and environments that are both accelerating and decelerating (denoted *-celerating). Accelerating environments. In accelerating M * environments, processes may accelerate continually, but they do not decelerate continually. In other words, while there may be no upper bound on absolute process speeds, there exists a lower bound on absolute process speeds. This lower bound on absolute process speeds (coupled with the upper bound on relative process speeds and the upper bound on message delay) yields an upper bound on end-to-end communication delay in terms of real-time clock ticks. However, there exists no upper bound on end-to-end communication delay in terms of action clock ticks (detailed discussion in Section 4).
Decelerating environments. In decelerating M * environments, processes may decelerate continually, but they do not accelerate continually. In other words, while there may be no lower bound on absolute process speeds, there exists an upper bound on absolute process speeds. This upper bound (coupled with the upper bound on relative process speeds and the upper bound on message delay) yields an upper bound on endto-end communication delay in terms of action clock ticks. However, there exists no upper bound on end-toend communication delay in terms of real-time clocks (detailed discussion in Section 4).
*-celerating environments. In M * environments where processes may accelerate and decelerate continually, there exists neither an upper bound, nor a lower bound, on absolute process speeds. This results in unbounded end-to-end communication delay in terms of both real-time clocks and action clocks.
Such unbounded end-to-end communication delay in terms of either real-time clocks, or action clocks, or both, in celerating environments is referred to as the celeration problem.
Action clocks in accelerating environments
In accelerating M * environments, the end-to-end communication delay is unbounded when denominated in ticks of an action clock. Informally, the argument is as follows: As processes accelerate, their action clocks tick faster. Consequently, there are an increasingly greater number of action-clock ticks per unit real-time. Therefore, although there exists an upper bound on real-time message delay, an action clock can tick an unbounded number of times while a message is in transit. Since message delay is unbounded in terms of action clock ticks, so is end-to-end communication delay.
More formally: Consider an accelerating M * environment. Let time be measured locally by action clocks. For the purpose of contradiction, assume that there exists an upper bound on message delay as measured by an action clock. Let such a bound be k. Note that the M * environment guarantees an upper bound on message delay in real time. Let this bound be ∆ time units. Since processes are continually accelerating, eventually (say, after real time t) process speeds exceed k ∆ actions per unit real time. Let some message m sent after time t experience a delay of ∆ real-time units. The message delay for m measured in action clock ticks exceeds k (because k ∆ ·∆ ≥ k). However, this contradicts our assumption that the upper bound on message delay as measured by an action clock does not exceed k. This implies that message delay measured in action clock ticks is unbounded. Therefore, in accelerating M * environments, the end-to-end communication delay of messages is unbounded when denominated in ticks of an action clock.
Real-time clocks in decelerating environments
In decelerating M * environments, the end-to-end communication delay is unbounded when denominated in ticks of a real-time clock. Informally, the argument is as follows: as processes decelerate, each action takes increasingly longer to execute. There is no upper bound on the time taken to execute an action. Since it takes at least one action to generate and to receive a message, there is no upper bound on the time taken to generate a message and to receive a message. Consequently, there is no upper bound on end-to-end communication delay.
More formally: Consider a decelerating M * environment. Let time be measured locally by perfect real-time clocks 2 . For the purpose of contradiction, we assume that there exists an upper bound on real-time end-toend communication delay. Let this bound be k realtime units. As processes decelerate, an increasingly greater duration of time elapses between consecutive steps. Eventually (say, after time t), the time between consecutive steps exceeds k. Since it requires at least one action to send or receive a message, after time t, generation of a message m takes longer than k real-time units. Consequently, the end-to-end communication delay for m exceeds k. This, however, contradicts our earlier assumption that end-to-end communication delay is bounded above by k. In other words, in decelerating M * environments, the end-to-end communication delay of a message is unbounded when denominated in ticks of a real-time clock. 2 Although it is not necessary for the real-time clocks to be perfect, we strengthen the clock specification in order to strengthen the negative result
Impact of the celeration problem
In this section, we discuss the impact of the celeration problem on failure detector correctness and system model specifications. As explained below, many existing implementations of failure detectors fail to behave correctly in celerating environments. This is symptomatic of how time is measured in these implementations. However, it is possible to circumvent this problem by either strengthening existing system models, or by adopting alternate system models. In fact, both approaches have been explored in recent work on failure detector implementations in partial synchrony.
Correctness of failure detector implementations
Recall from Section 2 that the existing implementations of failure detectors like 3P adaptively estimate the upper bound on end-to-end, or round-trip, communication delay. This upper bound is measured using either action clocks or real-time clocks. However, in celerating environments (as described in Section 4) the use of either clock (in isolation) is problematic.
Consider the 3P implementations that use action clocks. In runs where processes accelerate continually, although there exists an upper bound on end-to-end communication delay in real-time ticks, there is no upper bound on action-clock ticks. Hence, such implementations fail in accelerating environments.
On the other hand, consider the 3P implementations that use real-time clocks. In runs where processes decelerate arbitrarily, although there exists an upper bound on end-to-end communication delay when denominated in action-clock ticks, there is no upper bound on the number of real-time ticks. Hence, such implementations fail in decelerating environments.
That is, regardless of the choice of clock to measure time (either action clocks, or real-time clocks), these 3P implementations fail in celerating environments.
Existing approaches to failure detector correctness
Arguably, the celeration problem is not unknown to the research community. Recent work on failure detectors have addressed this problem by either (a) strengthening the system model to preclude certain celerating runs which would otherwise precipitate incorrect behavior, or (b) adopting alternate system models which encapsulate process celeration by subsuming restrictions on process speeds in restrictions on composite system behavior. We briefly visit both the approaches.
Strengthening system models
Recently proposed models like the Finite Average Response Time (FAR) model [11] and the Average Delay/Drop (ADD) model [23] make additional assumptions on absolute process speeds to circumvent the celeration problem. For instance, the FAR model [11] assumes an upper bound on absolute process speeds 3 . This assumption precludes continual acceleration of processes and allows failure detector implementations in the FAR model to use action clocks which are immune to continual process deceleration. In contrast, the ADD model [23] assumes a lower bound on absolute process speeds. This assumption precludes continual deceleration of processes and allows failure detector implementations in the ADD model to use real-time clocks which are immune to continual process acceleration.
Alternate system models
Alternate system models have been proposed that encapsulate process celeration in alternate specifications of system behavior, thereby voiding the celeration problem. Specifically, such models do not explicitly restrict message delay or process speeds. Instead, they encapsulate restrictions on message delay and process speeds in restrictions on composite system behavior (described below). Notable examples include the Asynchronous Bounded-Cycle (ABC) model [22] and the Theta model [16] which allow processes to accelerate and/or decelerate continually.
The ABC model imposes a restriction on the ratio of the number of messages that can be exchanged between pairs of processes in certain "relevant" segments of an asynchronous execution. On the other hand, the Theta model imposes a restriction on the ratio of the end-toend communication delay of messages that are simultaneously in transit. Note that the ratio of the number of messages exchanged between processes and the ratio of end-to-end communication delay experienced by messages is determined by message delay and process speeds. Therefore, any restriction on such composite system behavior ultimately imposes restrictions on message delay and process speeds.
Summary
Existing 3P implementations in M * and related models fail to behave correctly in celerating environments. Clearly, the celeration problem can be sidestepped in M * models by imposing bounds on absolute process speeds. Alternatively, the celeration problem can be voided by abandoning M * models in favor of models like the ABC model or the Theta model. But is either approach necessary to overcome the celeration problem? Is it possible to implement 3P in M * models without any additional assumptions? We answer the latter question in the affirmative by implementing 3P in M * without any additional assumptions.
Solving the celeration problem
In this section we introduce a new technique to overcome the celeration problem without assuming lower or upper bounds on absolute process speeds. Our solution is based on a composition of action clocks and real-time clocks and is motivated by the following observations: Message delay is bounded above in terms of real time. Therefore, there exists an upper bound on the number of ticks of a real-time clock while a message is in transit. Similarly, relative process speeds are bounded as well. Therefore, regardless of process celeration, there exists an upper bound on the number of local actions executed while messages that have been delivered at the recipient's receive buffer are being processed. In other words, there exists an upper bound on the number of action clock ticks in the duration it takes for a message to be processed. Therefore, running real-time clock timers when messages are in transit, and running action clock timers when messages are being processed, should make 3P implementations immune to the celeration problem. We explore this intuition in the remainder of this section.
System model
Before proceeding to the 3P implementation, we explicitly define the M * system model under which the failure detector will be implemented. The specification of M * models has been marginally modified (especially in the definition of global time) from [7] and [8] in order to simplify analysis. However, the specification still reflects the basic behavior of unknown bounds on message delay and relative process speeds which hold eventually.
• Processes. The system has a finite fixed set of processes Π. Processes execute actions in atomic steps. In an atomic step, a process receives at most one message from each process, makes a state transition, and sends at most one message to each process.
• Time. We posit the existence of a continuous Newtonian global time 4 measured by a fictitious global clock. The processes do not have access to the global clock; it is merely a modeling device.
• Runs. A run consists of an infinite sequence of steps taken by processes while executing an algorithm. For terminating algorithms, processes are modeled as having reached a final state S f with an infinite sequence of (no-op) steps thereafter so that the process transitions from S f to S f . Note that not all processes may execute an infinite sequence of steps. Only correct, i.e., non-faulty, processes execute an infinite sequence of steps.
In any given run, each atomic step taken by a process is associated with a unique global time instance called the occurrence time, which is the time at which the atomic step is executed. Such a sequence of occurrence times at each process is nondecreasing, and for every finite closed interval of time [t 1 , t 2 ] (where t 1 ≤ t 2 ), there are only finitely many steps whose occurrence time is within that interval 5 .
• Faults. In each run, processes are either correct or faulty. Correct processes execute actions according to their algorithm specification, and never fail. Faulty processes, on the other hand, fail after finite time. Processes can fail only by crashing, which occurs when a process ceases execution without warning and never recovers. Any process that is not crashed is considered to be live.
• Channels. Processes send and receive messages to each other through channels. Each process is assumed to be connected to all the processes in the system by bi-directional reliable channels.
• Clocks. Processes are assumed to have access to a local real-time clock which measures time in discrete integer valued steps with some unknown bound D on the drift rate 6 . A clock is said to have a drift rate of D, if the following holds true: for every interval of t global time units, the clock measures no less than ( t D ) time units and no greater than (t · D) time units.
• Message delay. Channels are assumed to deliver messages at the recipient's receive buffer within some unknown bound ∆ global time units on delay.
We assume no lower bounds on message delay.
• Message buffering delay. Message buffering delay is the duration between the time that a message is delivered at the recipient's receive buffer and the time that the message is actually processed by the receiving process. The message buffering delay is assumed to be bounded above by B local actions at the receiving process, where B in unknown. In other words, if a message m arrives at a process p's receive buffer at time t, then m is processed by p within the next B local actions at p.
• Relative process speeds. The relative process speeds are assumed to be bounded above by (an unknown) Φ, i.e., in the duration that a correct process executes Φ atomic steps, each correct process executes at least 1 atomic step. Note that absolute process speeds are not bounded, and processes may accelerate and/or decelerate continually while maintaining the bound on relative process speeds.
Bichronal clocks
We introduce a new clock called a bichronal clock. It is a composition of an action clock and a real-time clock. A bichronal clock has the following properties:
• Composition: A bichronal clock consists of an action clock a and a real-time clock r.
• Two-dimensional Time: The time on a bichronal clock is the vector a.time, r.time where a.time is the value of the action clock, and r.time the value of the real-time clock. These time components are independent and will not be ordered lexicographically.
Similarly, a bichronal timer consists of an action clock timer and a real-time clock timer. It counts down from a given value (a t , r t ) where a t is the starting value for the action clock timer, and r t is the starting value for the real-time clock timer. A bichronal timer is said to have timed out iff both the action clock timer and the real-time clock timer have timed out. The pseudo-code for a bichronal timer is shown in Fig. 1 .
class bichronalT imer() actionClockTimer a realtimeClockTimer r 1 : method start ( integer actionT ime, realT ime) 2 :
a.start(actionT ime) 3 :
r.start(realT ime) 4 :
upon (a.expire() and r.expire()) 5 :
send timer expiry notification 6 : end method 7 : method stop () 8 :
a.stop(); r.stop() 9 : end method Bichronal timers satisfy the following two lemmas which are based on their specification. Lemma 6.1. If a bichronal timer tmr starts with a value (t a , D · t r ), then tmr runs for at least t r global time units.
Proof. If a bichronal timer tmr starts with a value (t a , D · t r ), then it starts two timers concurrently: an action clock timer a with value t a , and a real-time clock timer r with value D · t r . The timer tmr does not expire until both a and r expire. But r expires only after D · t r real-time clock ticks. Therefore, tmr does not expire until D · t r real-time clock ticks. However, r has a bound D on drift rate, hence r takes at least t r global time units to tick D · t r times. In other words, tmr runs for at least t r global time units. Lemma 6.2. If a bichronal timer tmr starts with a value (t a , D · t r ), then tmr runs for at least t a local actions.
Proof. If a bichronal timer tmr starts with a value (t a , D · t r ), then it starts two timers concurrently: an action timer a with value t a , and a real-time clock timer r with value D · t r . The timer tmr does not expire until both a and r expire. But a expires after t a action clock ticks. Therefore, tmr runs for at least t a local actions.
The idea of composing multiple time bases into a composite time base is not new. For instance, Fetzer
and Raynal proposed such a composition in [9] called Elastic Vector time. Like a bichronal clock, elastic vector time is a composition of two scalar time bases: logical time and real time. However, the main distinction between the compositional techniques of elastic vector time and bichronal clocks is the following: In elastic vector time, the logical clocks are updated to the value of the real time clocks infinitely often (subject to certain conditions). On the other hand, in bichronal clocks, the two time bases (logical and real) run independently of each other and are not correlated in any way (except insofar as both time bases eventually move forward in non-faulty processes).
Implementing 3P
In this section, we present an implementation of 3P in M * using bichronal clocks. Let the set of processes in the M * system be Π. At each process p in Π, the action system 3P-exec (in Fig. 2 ) for the local 3P module is executed for each process q that p monitors. Thus, each process p runs |Π| instances of 3P-exec.
The algorithm shown in Fig. 2 is a ping-ack based implementation of 3P. It uses a bichronal timer tmr, and an initial estimate on the timeouts for the bichronal timer (timerV alue). The algorithm starts by executing Action 1 in which p sends a ping to process q, starts the bichronal timer tmr, and sets the variable phase to 1. If tmr expires before receiving an ack from q, Action 2 is enabled. In Action 2, if phase = 4, then p restarts tmr and increments phase else p suspects q as having crashed. If p receives an ack, Action 1 is enabled. In Action 1, if q is suspected as having crashed, then it could be a false suspicion (because p just received an ack from q). Hence, p trusts q, and increments the estimate on timeouts on the bichronal clock. Process p then sends a new ping message to q, and restarts tmr. In Action 3, p sends an ack for every ping that it receives from q.
Proof of correctness
The algorithm runs a ping-ack protocol between p and q. The ping-ack protocol consists of a sequence of ping-ack transactions, each of which consists of four phases: ping-in-transit phase, ack-generation phase, ack-in-transit phase, and ack-processing phase, in that order. The ping-in-transit phase begins when p sends a ping to q, and ends when the ping is delivered to q's receive buffer. The ack-generation phase begins when the ping is delivered to q's buffer, and ends when q sends an ack (for the ping) back to p. The ack-in-transit phase begins when q sends the ack to p, and ends when the ack is delivered to p's receive buffer. The ack-processing phase begins when the ack is delivered to p's receive buffer, and ends when a new ping is sent to q. Note that the ping-in-transit phase and the ack-intransit phase can last at most ∆ global time units each. It takes q at most B local actions to generate an ack after the ping has been delivered to its receive buffer. During this time, p can execute at most B · Φ local actions each. Therefore, the ack-generation phase can last at most B · Φ local actions at p. Since it takes at most B local actions at p to process an ack after it has been delivered to its receive buffer, the ack-processing phase can last at most B local actions at p.
Intuitively, in the algorithm in Fig. 2 , the variable phase strives to follow (lag behind) the corresponding 4 phases of each ping-ack transaction. Eventually (and this is demonstrated in the proofs), when phase = 1, the current ping-ack transaction is in the ping-in-transit phase or later; when phase = 2, the current ping-ack transaction is in the ack-generation phase or later; when phase = 3, the current ping-ack transaction is in the ack-in-transit phase or later; and when phase = 4, the current ping-ack transaction is in the ack-processing phase, or has already terminated.
In order to prove correctness, we have to show that the algorithm in Fig. 2 satisfies the strong completeness and eventual strong accuracy properties of 3P. The intuitive basis for the correctness is as follows:
Strong Completeness. If p is correct and q crashes, then eventually q does not send an ack in response to p's ping. When this happens, the bichronal timer tmr eventually expires, the phase variable is incremented, and tmr is restarted. But eventually the phase variable is incremented to 4, and when the bichronal timer expires while phase equals 4, p starts suspecting q. Since p never receives an ack from q in the future, p continues to suspect q permanently thereafter. Since p and q can be any pair of correct and faulty processes, respectively, it follows that every correct process eventually and permanently suspects every crashed process.
Eventual Strong Accuracy. On the other hand, if both p and q are correct, then p may falsely suspect q as having crashed. However, eventually p receives an ack from q (because q is correct, and hence sends acks to p's pings). If p receives an ack while it suspects q, then p increments its bichronal timer value (in line 4 of Action 1). Hence, after max(D · ∆, B · Φ) such false positives, the timer value increments to max(D · ∆, B · Φ) + 1. Refer to this time as t con (for convergence).
Note that tmr does not expire until the real-time clock timer expires, which is at least D · ∆ real-time clock ticks, which is at least ∆ global time units. Similarly, tmr does not expire until the action clock timer expires, which is at least B · Φ local actions.
Consider a ping sent from p to q after time t con . When the bichronal timer tmr starts for the first time, phase = 1, and the ping-ack transaction is in the pingin-transit phase. The timer tmr runs for at least ∆ global time units. Therefore, when tmr expires while phase = 1, the ping would have been delivered at q (because ∆ is the upper bound on message delay). In other words, by the time tmr expires, the ping-ack transaction is in the ack-generation phase or later. Therefore, when tmr expires for the first time, the ping-ack transaction is in the ack-generation phase or later If tmr expires while phase = 1, p increments phase to 2, and restarts tmr. Since tmr runs for at least B · Φ local actions at p, process q executes at least B actions before timer expiry, which is a sufficient number of actions for q to generate and send the ack (if it has not done so already). In other words, by the time tmr expires for the second time, the ping-ack transaction is in ack-in-transit phase or later.
If tmr expires while phase = 2, p increments phase to 3, and restarts tmr. Again, tmr runs for at least ∆ global time units, which is sufficient time for the ack to be delivered at p's receive buffer (if it has not already been delivered). In other words, by the time tmr expires for the third time, the ping-ack transaction is in the ackprocessing phase or later.
If tmr expires while phase = 3, p increments phase to 4, and restarts tmr. Again, tmr does not expire until p executes B · Φ actions. However, p takes receipt of the ack in its receive buffer within B local actions (if it has not done so already). Therefore, p receives the ack for the ping before tmr expires for the forth time (when phase = 4). Hence, p does not suspect q for pings sent after time t con .
In other words, p may falsely suspect q only finitely many times after which it never suspects q. This holds true for all pairs of correct processes p and q. Thus, the algorithm in Fig. 2 satisfies eventual strong accuracy.
The formal proof is given next.
Strong completeness
Theorem 7.1. The algorithm in Fig. 2 satisfies strong completeness.
Proof. Recall that the strong completeness property states that every crashed process is eventually and permanently suspected by all correct processes. Consider a run of the algorithm in Fig. 2 where process p is correct and process q is faulty. Let q crash at time t. At time t, one of the following four cases holds: (a) a ping is in transit from p to q, or (b) q has received a ping from p, but has not executed Action 3, or (c) an ack is in transit from q to p, or (d) p has received an ack from q but has not executed Action 1 since.
Cases (a) and (b). Process p never receives an ack from q in the future (because q is crashed). Consequently, the bichronal timer tmr at p eventually expires, phase is incremented, and tmr is restarted. Eventually, phase is set to 4. When phase equals 4 and the bichronal clock expires, p starts suspecting q. Since no ack from q arrives in the future, Action 1 is never enabled and line 3 in Action 1 is never executed. Therefore, p suspects q permanently thereafter.
Cases (c) and (d). Process p eventually receives (or already has received) an ack from q. This enables Action 1, and a ping is sent from p to q. This reduces to Case (a) (which has been analyzed in the previous paragraph).
Hence, if a process q crashes, then a correct process p eventually and permanently suspects q. Since p and q can be any pair of correct and faulty processes, respectively, it follows that every crashed process is eventually and permanently suspected by all correct processes.
Eventual strong accuracy
Recall that eventual strong accuracy states that for each run, there exists a time after which no correct process is suspected by any correct process. Consider two correct processes p and q in a run α of the algorithm in Fig. 2 . Lemma 7.2. If p sends a ping to q at global time t 1 , where timerV alue ≥ max(B · Φ, D · ∆) + 1 , and the bichronal timer tmr expires when phase = 1 at global time t 2 in the current ping-ack transaction, then at time t 2 the ping-ack transaction is in the ackgeneration phase or later.
Proof. If p sends a ping to q at global time t 1 , then phase = 1 at t 1 (from Action 1 in Fig. 2 ). Let timerV alue ≥ max(B · Φ, D · ∆) + 1 at t 1 . From Action 1 in Fig. 2 we know that the bichronal timer tmr starts with value (timerV alue, timerV alue) when p sends a ping to q. If tmr expires when phase = 1 at time t 2 , then from Lemma 6.1 we know that tmr ran for at least ∆ global time units. Recall that the upper bound on message delay is ∆ global time units. Therefore, by time t 2 the ping sent by p at time t 1 has already been delivered to q's receive buffer (and may or may not have been processed by q). Note that the ackgeneration phase starts when the ping is delivered to q's receive buffer. Therefore, at time t 2 the ping-ack transaction is in the ack-generation phase or later.
Lemma 7.3. If p sends a ping to q at global time t 1 , where timerV alue ≥ max(B · Φ, D · ∆) + 1 , and the bichronal timer tmr expires when phase = 2 at global time t 3 in the current ping-ack transaction, then at time t 3 the ping-ack transaction is in the ack-in-transit phase or later.
Proof. If p sends a ping to q at global time t 1 , then phase = 1 at t 1 (from Action 1 in Fig. 2 ). Let the bichronal timer tmr expire when phase = 1 at time t 2 . From Lemma 7.2, we know that at time t 2 the pingack transaction is in the ack-generation phase or later. From Action 2 in Fig. 2 , we know that after time t 2 the variable phase = 2, and tmr is restarted with value (timerV alue, timerV alue). Since timerV alue > B · Φ, if tmr expires when phase = 2 at time t 3 , then from Lemma 6.2 we know that tmr ran for at least B · Φ local actions at p after t 2 . In other words, p executed at least B · Φ actions after the ping-ack transaction was in ack-generation phase. Since the upper bound on relative process speeds is Φ, during the time that p executes B · Φ actions, q executes at least B actions. In other words, when tmr expired at time t 3 , process q had executed at least B actions after the ping was delivered to q's receive buffer. Therefore by time t 3 , process q had already processed the ping (because a message in the receive buffer is processed within B local actions) and sent the ack. Note that the ack-in-transit phase starts when the ack is sent from q to p. Therefore, at time t 3 , the ping-ack transaction is in the ack-in-transit phase or later.
Lemma 7.4. If p sends a ping to q at global time t 1 , where timerV alue ≥ max(B · Φ, D · ∆) + 1 , and the bichronal timer tmr expires when phase = 3 at global time t 4 in the current ping-ack transaction, then at time t 4 the ping-ack transaction is in the ackprocessing phase or later.
Proof. If p sends a ping to q at global time t 1 , then phase = 1 at t 1 (from Action 1 in Fig. 2 ). Let the bichronal timer tmr expire when phase = 2 at time t 3 . From Lemma 7.3, we know that at time t 3 the ping-ack transaction is in the ack-in-transit phase or later. In other words, q sent an ack to p in the current ping-ack transaction at time t 3 or earlier. From Action 2 in Fig. 2 , we know that after time t 3 the variable phase = 3, and tmr is restarted with value (timerV alue, timerV alue). Since timerV alue > D · ∆, if tmr expires when phase = 3 at time t 4 , then from Lemma 6.1 we know that tmr ran for at least ∆ global time units. Recall that the upper bound on message delay is ∆ global time units. Therefore, by time t 4 the ack sent by q (at time t 3 or earlier) has already been delivered to p's receive buffer (and may or may not have been processed by p). Note that the ackprocessing phase starts when the ack is delivered to p's receive buffer. Therefore, at time t 4 the ping-ack transaction is in the ack-processing phase or later.
Lemma 7.5. If p sends a ping to q at global time t 1 , where timerV alue ≥ max(B · Φ, D · ∆) + 1 , and phase = 4 and bichronal timer tmr is unexpired at time t 5 in the current ping-ack transaction, then p receives the ack from q before tmr expires.
Proof. If p sends a ping to q at global time t 1 , then phase = 1 at t 1 (from Action 1 in Fig. 2 ). Let the bichronal timer tmr expire when phase = 3 at time t 4 . From Lemma 7.4, we know that at t 4 the pingack transaction is in the ack-processing phase or later. In other words, the ack from q was delivered to p's buffer at time t 4 or earlier. From Action 2 in Fig. 2 , we know that after t 4 the variable phase = 4, and tmr is restarted with value (timerV alue, timerV alue). Since timerV alue > B · Φ, we know from Lemma 6.2 that if tmr expires, then it will expire after at least B ·Φ actions at p. However, p processes messages in its receive buffer within B actions after they are delivered. Therefore, p takes receipt of the ack from q before tmr expires. Theorem 7.6. The algorithm in Fig. 2 satisfies eventual strong accuracy Proof. Consider a run α of the algorithm in Fig. 2 . Let p and q be two correct processes in this run, and let p send a ping to process q at time t. If p's timer tmr expires 4 times successively after time t but before receiving an ack from q, then p suspects q. However, since q is correct, q will eventually send an ack for each ping, and that ack will eventually be received by p. Therefore, every time p suspects q, p eventually receives an ack from q and stops suspecting q (Action 1 in Fig. 2) .
Consider the following metric m(timerV alue) = max(B · Φ, D · ∆) + 1 − timerV alue. Every time p receives an ack from q while q is suspected, p increments its timerV alue (line 4, Action 1 in Fig. 2) . Thus, every such false suspicion decrements the metric m(timerV alue). If m(timerV alue) never becomes 0 in α, then it implies that p suspects q only finitely many times.
On the other hand, if m(timerV alue) becomes 0 in α, it implies timerV alue = max(B · Φ, D · ∆) + 1. This happens after max(B · Φ, D · ∆) false suspicions. Let m(timerV alue) = 0 at time t per (after which 3P provides perfect information as demonstrated next). Consider any time t suf f > t per (in the suffix) at which p sends a ping to q.
Upon sending a ping to q, p starts tmr with timer value tmr ≥ max(B · Φ, D · ∆) + 1 and phase = 1. Every time tmr expires before p receives an ack from q, it increments phase and restarts tmr until phase = 4.
If p receives an ack from q before phase = 4, then p does not suspect q. From Lemma 7.5, we know that if phase = 4, timerV alue ≥ max(B · Φ, D · ∆) + 1, and tmr is unexpired, then p receives the ack from q before tmr expires. This enables Action 1 and p does not suspect q. Therefore, if m(timerV alue) = 0 in α, then p does not suspect q in an infinite suffix of α.
Thus, for any two correct processes p and q, p suspects q only finitely many times. In other words, there exists an unknown time after which no correct process is suspected by any correct process.
Theorem 7.7. The algorithm in Fig. 2 implements 3P.
Proof. From Theorems 7.1 and 7.6, we know that the algorithm in Fig. 2 satisfies strong completeness and eventual strong accuracy, thus implementing 3P.
Conclusion
Portability. The novelty in this paper is the introduction of bichronal clocks. In the implementation in Fig. 2 , bichronal timers are used like action clock and real-time clock timers. Thus, existing implementations of 3P can be modified to use bichronal clocks instead of either action or real-time clocks, and automatically be made immune to the celeration problem. This is indicative of the portability and universal applicability of bichronal clocks in M * and, possibly, other customized models of partial synchrony.
Heartbeat-based implementations. Although we have demonstrated the use of bichronal timers only in a ping-ack based 3P implementation, bichronal timers may be used in heartbeat-based 3P implementations too (e.g. [2, 23, 5, 4] ). In heartbeat-based implementations, the local failure detector module at each process p sends periodic "heartbeats" to all the processes that monitor p. The monitoring processes then adaptively estimate the inter-arrival time of these heartbeats 7 . In heartbeat-based implementations, each process p will need at least one bichronal timer (or possibly more, depending on the details of the implementation) to determine the time to send the next set of heartbeats to the processes monitoring p. This bichronal timer is run exactly once per heartbeat generation. Process p will also need at least one bichronal timer to estimate the maximum inter-arrival time of heartbeats from the processes being monitored by p. The second bichronal timer would be run at most twice (successively) per heartbeat inter-arrival because the inter-arrival delay consists of two distinct delays: (1) message delay in transit, and (2) processing delay at the recipient's receive buffer.
Performance. In practice, it is often assumed that physical limitations (such as the speed of light, or the size of an atom) impose an upper bound on absolute process speed. Therefore, it can be argued that assuming an upper bound on process speeds and using real-time clocks alone is sufficiently realistic. While this may be true, bichronal clocks, in addition to correctness, boost performance of 3P as well.
In traditional action-clock based implementations of 3P, every time hardware is upgraded, processes accelerate. Hence, the 3P module could start falsely timing out on correct processes resulting in longer time to convergence and increased system volatility. Using bichronal-clock based implementations eliminates this behavior because although the action clock component of the bichronal clock may falsely timeout on hardware upgrades, the real-time clock does not.
Similarly, in traditional real-time clock based implementations of 3P, during periods of increased stress like server overloads, denial-of-service attacks, and such, processes in the system decelerate globally. The 3P module could start falsely timing out on correct processes due to poor response times from processes. Using bichronal-clock based implementations eliminates this behavior because although the real-time clock component of the bichronal clock may falsely timeout, the ac-tion clock does not.
Thus, in addition to providing immunity from process celeration, bichronal clocks also enable systems to minimize the volatility precipitated by system upgrades and periods of high stress.
